Learning the lessons of the Crimean War

The army at the end of the Crimean war was an army in search of answers.  Why had the mighty Russian army been unable to repel an invader on its own soil?  When answers were given, they were difficult for many to accept.  They reached back to the reign of Tsar Nicolas I who had allowed his generals to place more emphasis on parade ground performance than on actual war fighting.  Still others blamed the institution of Serfdom for the failing.

Tsar Alexander II was determined to bring Russia up from that stinging defeat.  He began by instituting a number of reforms both social and military.  In 1861 he liberated the serfs.  Eliminating the army's fixation with the parade was next to be addressed.  He did this by appointing D. A. Miliutin as war minister in 1861.  

Miliutin favored dramatic changes in the organization of the Russian army.  When he arrived the army was a large, expensive, and clumsy institution.  He felt that it would be easier to maintain a smaller cadre army and a large reserve.  In this way the army could swell to tremendous size in times of crisis, while remaining affordable during peacetime.  The strategy would also depend on the ability to mobilize the reserves rapidly so sufficient power could be brought to bear on an adversary.  It was not a new idea, but rather one that emulated the Prussian model.  Even so it would require practice and officers capable of leading on their own if it was to work.

In 1874 the Statue on Universal Military Service was passed.  This required all men to perform six years of active duty service (and a further nine years in the reserve) from their twenty first birthday regardless of social station.  It replaced the older system of Nicholas I that forced serfs into 25 years of military service.  The statute would also make it possible for Miliutin to call up the vast numbers of men required in the event of war.

Overall, the reforms would allow the army to go from a small cadre force to a massive army in a short period of time.  Unfortunately the army would not be able to supply this mass force for long because logistics and support services had been neglected.  This would cause the Russian army no end of trouble in the coming war with Turkey.

Small Arms Development

The experience of fighting men armed with rifled weapons during the Crimean War was not lost on the Russian army.  They moved as quickly as possible to arm their troops with rifles.  The old .70 caliber M-1845 musket was officially replaced in 1857 by a rifled muzzle loader made in Germany and Belgium.  Within five years the army would be armed with 260,106 of these 1857 vintovka rifles.  This would again change after the Austro-Prussian war that proved breechloading weapons superior to muzzle loading ones.  This led the Russians into a haphazard and expensive program to adapt a modern firearm.

In 1867 they began converting some 200,000 weapons into breechloaders.  The program was led by a Swedish inventor Karle.  The program was very problematic and alternatives were rapidly sought.  The Grand Duke personally purchased 10,000 Baranov rifles for testing and evaluation.  The army settled for the Krnk rifle in 1869 which proved to be a less costly alternative to the Baranov.  The War Ministry purchased over 800,000 Krnk rifles that year, but they also had problems.

In an effort to find a more acceptable weapon a delegation of Russian officers led by Colonel A. P. Gorlov travelled to the United States.  The delegation tested many weapons, but soon settled for a rifle made by Hiram Berdan.  It was adopted as the Berdan I in 1868 (while the Krnk was being selected over the Baranov back home).  The next year Hiram Berdan visited St. Petersburg with an improved version of his rifle known as the Berdan II.  It was quickly selected to replace all other rifles as the official arm of the infantry.

Colonel Gorlov was also interested in the new Gatling guns that the Americans were developing.  Several examples were sent to Russia where they became known as Gorlov guns. 

Pistols received much less attention by Colonel Gorlov, partly because they were to be acquired in smaller numbers.  The weapon selected for the Army would be the Smith & Wesson Model 3 revolver, though the 1851 Colt Navy percussion revolver had been in limited use for some time.  The colonel ordered 142,333 of the weapons (primarily for cavalry and gendarmes).  It would also be made in three slightly different variations during this time.

These small arms decisions of this period were a dramatic step towards making the army a modern fighting force.  Yet the very size of the army would work against it.  Different regiments would often be armed with different weapons as they moved to the Berdan II.  The Russo-Turkish war would see the army in the middle of the transition, a factor that would complicate their war effort.

Advances in Artillery

The Russian field artillery arm was in a state of uncertainty following the Crimean war.  It was clear that their bronze muzzle-loading cannon were rapidly becoming obsolete in the era of the rifled firearm.  The weapons lacked the range to support the infantry without being fired upon by enemy infantry in return.  Changing over to more modern weapons was very expensive and of unknown value.  So for the first decade after the Crimean war artillery practices remained the same.

This would change in the early 1860's when Defense Minister Miliutin began acquiring rifled breech loading cannon made of steel for the army.  The artillerymen soon changed their thinking away from simple volume of fire toward delivering more accurate fire against the enemy.  The infantry could now be supported without exposing the gun crew to enemy rifle fire.

Further advances came in the early 1870's when the military conducted experiments with high angle fire, allowing them to engage targets that could not be directly observed.  That same year the War Ministry approved the 'bracket method' for fire correction, and began working out ranging tables using weather data and mathematics.  The army also experimented with centralized fire control.  New ammunition was also developed, as had new fuzes for the shells (time and impact).

Unfortunately, the Russian treasury was unable to keep up with the advances in the artillery field.  Each gun battery was issued approximately 130 rounds for training each year, only eight of which were live.  This led to a lack of understanding as to what the cannon were actually capable of, and so many officers erred on the side of caution and used the guns in the same manner as their predecessors had in the Crimean war.  The result was to negate many of the advantages that the new cannon provided.

Cavalry Developments

The period between the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars was full of uncertainty for the cavalry.  Many believed that the advent of rifled firearms would put an end to the horsemen.  The recent experience in the Crimean war had shown that the cavalry had lost their shock value.  The indecision was compounded by the fact that the cavalry was often the branch of the army most affected by the parade-o-mania that had lost the Russians the previous war.  Clearly it would be difficult to change their doctrine to something more tactically advantageous.

Reports of cavalry actions during the American Civil War would be the first glimmer of hope for the reformers.  In that conflict Russian observers concluded that cavalry would best be used for reconnaissance and as a long range force to disrupt enemy supply lines and communications.

With this new direction the Russian army moved to remold its cavalry over the protects of more traditionally minded generals.  It began in 1869 with the issuing of a new regulation for the cavalry.  It replaced the older version printed in 1845 and reorganized the cavalry regiments into more flexible formations, and gave more emphasis on training.  Much of the publication was devoted to the matter of conducting an attack, as opposed to a parade.  

The cavalrymen were also prepared for different types of missions, such as the taking and holding of objectives far from the front line.  To facilitate this, the Dragoon formations began training in dismounted combat.  Several exercises were also held to test the validity of the new doctrine.  They soon proved that they would be capable of operations far from the front line.

By 1876 the cavalry numbered a full 19 divisions (two Guards, two Cossack, 14 army, and the Caucasian division).  Still, it was very expensive to maintain and it couldn't be expanded by adding reserves as easily as the infantry.

Major Exercises and Mobilizations

There were few military exercises conducted in the years immediately following the Crimean War.  This was because of the need to modernize the army.  The first major exercise would take place in 1865 after the units returned from quelling the rebellion in Poland.  After that event military exercises became annual affairs until the start of the Russo-Turkish war.  Most of these took place in the summer at Krasnoe Selo outside of St. Petersburg.  They usually lasted from eight to twelve days and incorporated all three branches of the army.  Smaller exercises were held elsewhere in Russia during this time, but they were poorly coordinated and did not come close to the events at outside of St. Petersburg.  New tactics were tested at many of these events, but others became purely staged affairs reminiscent of the problems before the Crimean defeat.

Several mobilizations to test the readiness of the army were also undertaken during this time.  By the time of the Polish rebellion the whole of the Russian army could be readied in ten weeks.  Further improvements were made that by 1867 it would take between three and ten weeks depending on the district.  This was again improved so that by 1872 it would take between two and six weeks for the slowest district to ready itself.  As impressive as this all may seem, the Russian army still ignored the railroad as a primary means of moving large numbers of men and supplies across vast distances.

The last major mobilization occurred in 1876-77 when the Russians called up some 200,000 men to force an armistice on Turkey after the defeat of Serbia.  The mobilization showed the world that Russia was now able to efficiently organize its armed forces and quickly ready them for war.